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Abstract
Cyberinfrastructure is increasingly becoming target of a wide spectrum of attacks from Denial of
Service to large-scale defacement of the digital presence of an organization. Intrusion Detection System
(IDSs) provide administrators a defensive edge over intruders lodging such malicious attacks. However,
with the sheer number of different IDSs available, one has to objectively assess the capabilities of different
IDSs to select an IDS that meets specific organizational requirements. A prerequisite to enable such
an objective assessment is the implicit comparability of IDS literature. In this study, we review IDS
literature to understand the implicit comparability of IDS literature from the perspective of metrics
used in the empirical evaluation of the IDS. We identified 22 metrics commonly used in the empirical
evaluation of IDS and constructed search terms to retrieve papers that mention the metric. We manually
reviewed a sample of 495 papers and found 159 of them to be relevant. We then estimated the number
of relevant papers in the entire set of papers retrieved from IEEE. We found that, in the evaluation
of IDSs, multiple different metrics are used and the trade-off between metrics is rarely considered. In
a retrospective analysis of the IDS literature, we found the the evaluation criteria has been improving
over time, albeit marginally. The inconsistencies in the use of evaluation metrics may not enable direct
comparison of one IDS to another.
1 Introduction
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been a popular defensive strategy used in protecting entire enterprise
networks, hosts in a network, or processes on a host from cyber attacks. IDSs are particularly popular because
of their ability to detect insider abuse and/or outsider penetration. Over the years, the number of approaches
to intrusion detection has seen a dramatic increase with over 400 literary works published in the year 2015
alone.1
The sheer number of intrusion detection literature provides organizations with an opportunity to choose
an IDS that best suits their unique set of requirements. However, to objectively pick one intrusion detection
approach over another, there is a need for the approaches to have been evaluated1. considering potential
trade-off between the evaluation metrics used and 2. using evaluation metrics that may be directly compared.
In this study, we systematically review intrusion detection literature to understand the extent to which the
literature is comparable. We note that our study does not focus on the intrusion detection approach itself
but the metrics used in its evaluation.
Research on intrusion detection systems tends not to be generalizable. Though they are quite widely
used and serve an important purpose, the lack of common metrics makes it difficult to compare individual
IDS’s. In this study, we performed a comprehensive literature review of academic papers written about IDSs
and studied the use of specific metrics that were referenced.
1Source: Google Scholar with title-only search for “intrusion detection system” restricted to works published in the year
2015.
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The research contribution of this work is an empirical study of the intrusion detection literature. The
results of this work will help guide researchers into conducting better studies, and will help guide practitioners
in making a more informed decision about the intrusion detection system they analyze.
2 Research Questions
We address the following research questions in this study:
RQ0 Usage What are the commonly used evaluation metrics?
RQ1 Comparable Are empirical studies of intrusion detection systems comparable using consistent eval-
uation metrics?
RQ2 Trade-off Do empirical studies of intrusion detection systems consistently convey trade-off between
evaluation metrics?
RQ3 Evolution Have empirical studies of intrusion detection systems improved evaluation criteria over
time?
3 Related Work
In 2002, in a survey of intrusion detection research, Lundin and Jonsson [1] have highlighted the lack of
methods for testing, evaluating, and comparing IDSs as one of the open research areas. The off-line intru-
sion detection evaluation program initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
provides researchers with a testbed for consistently evaluating intrusion detection systems, however, the
evaluation testbed is one factor in consistently evaluating IDSs. The testbed was used in the evaluation of
several IDSs the results of which were published [2, 3]. Haines et al. [4] extended the DARPA testbed by
proposing the Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT). While a standard-
ized testbed provides a common platform for evaluating IDSs, researchers are still required to execute the
various IDSs to compare their performance. In our study, we are surveying the literature to understand the
extent to which intrusion detection literature is implicitly comparable.
At their core, IDSs work on the principle of labeling an action as an anomaly (in case of anomaly-based
detection) or misuse (in case of misuse-based detection). IDSs typically monitor some form of information
stream (e.g. gateway in network-based IDS, system calls to kernel in host-based IDS). A number of re-
searchers [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] have surveyed the approaches used to label an action as an anomaly or misuse.
Modi et al. [9] highlight some of the challenges of detecting intrusions in a cloud computing environment.
Similarly, Anantvalee and Wu [8] and Butun et al. [10] discuss the nuances of deploying IDSs in the context
of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), respectively. The survey of
IDSs mentioned so far, while comprehensive in describing the detection approach and architecture, do not
highlight the evaluation aspect of IDSs. In our study, we wish to highlight the inconsistencies that may exist
in the evaluation of IDSs.
4 Methodology
As mentioned earlier, the primary focus of our study is on the metrics used in the evaluation of IDSs. At a
high-level, the approach to select the primary studies for our research may be summarized as follows:
• Identify source(s) of papers
• Identify evaluation metrics
• Identify search terms for the evaluation metrics
• Collect papers using the search terms from the source(s) identified
• Filter papers based on inclusion criteria
The methodology is inspired by guidelines prescribed by Kitchenham and Charters [11].
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4.1 Identify source(s) of papers
A fundamental step in any systematic literature review study is the identification of the academic sources
from which the papers to review will be chosen. The most commonly used sources are the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) publication
databases. Searching for papers in IEEE and ACM databases is made possible by sophisticated web-based
interfaces provided by the organizations that index the database. In our study, we have used the IEEE
database as the source of papers. The IEEE Xplore (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/) is the search service
provided by IEEE and some of its features (like the bulk export of search results) are conducive to systematic
literature reviews.
4.2 Identify Evaluation Metrics
The prerequisite to the selection of primary studies was to identify, from prior literature, the metrics com-
monly used in the evaluation of IDSs. As mentioned earlier, an IDS essentially classifies an action as being
an intrusion or otherwise. The effectiveness of the classification is one among many dimensions along which
an IDS may be evaluated. Therefore, in identifying the evaluation metrics, we did not constrain ourselves
to particular dimension. We used IEEE Xplore with the blanket query—“intrusion detection system”—to
search for all papers that mention IDS. We selected the top 1,000 papers from the IEEE Xplore search
results, ordered by relevance. Three authors collectively examined 158 papers and identified the evaluation
metric(s) used (if any). In the context of this step, an evaluation metric was defined as in Definition 1.
Definition 1 Evaluation Metric—An evaluation metric is a repeatable system for expressing the quantitative
evidence when reasoning about the empirical characteristics (such as effectiveness, performance, and energy
consumption) of an IDS.
Precision and recall are typical examples of an evaluation metric used in expressing the empirical ef-
fectiveness of an IDS. We chose to ignore metrics that were specific to an implementation. For instance,
“number of generations” is a metric that is often used when genetic programming is employed to generate
network intrusion detection rules based on regular expressions. While such implementation-specific metric
may be relevant to future IDS implementations, we regard them as “internal” metrics and consider them as
not conveying any external evidence.
We identified 22 different metrics used in the evaluation of IDSs. The evaluation metrics were grouped
into four categories: (a) effectiveness, (b) performance, (c) energy, and (d) deterministic finite automaton
(DFA). The categorization of the metrics enable a logical grouping of literature that evaluated an IDS along
different dimensions.
4.3 Identify search terms for the evaluation metrics
The evaluation metrics identified previously were used to develop search terms. Typically, a one-to-one
mapping exists between the search term and an evaluation metric with the name of the metric being the
search term. However, when commonly used synonyms and/or context-specific variations of the name of
a metric are considered, the mapping between the metric and the search terms becomes one-to-many. For
example, the metric recall has synonyms sensitivity, hit rate, and true positive rate and a context-specific
variation detection rate (in the context of an IDS).
4.4 Collect papers using the search terms from the source(s) identified
The search term(s) identified are logically combined to construct a search string the syntax of which is
prescribed by the search engine used to search for the papers in the source(s) identified (IEEE Xplore, in
our case). The search strings for each of the evaluation metrics considered in our study are presented in
Appendix A. The search strings conform to the syntax prescribed by IEEE Xplore. See http://ieeexplore.
ieee.org/Xplorehelp/#/searching-ieee-xplore/search-examples#command-search-examples for more
information on the IEEE Xplore search strings.
We note that, in collecting the papers, we did not restrict the publication venue as our initial exploratory
searches resulted in papers published in a variety of venues.
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4.5 Filter papers based on inclusion criteria
The number of search results returned by IEEE Xplore may be controlled by applying a filter criteria
(automated or manual), commonly known as the inclusion criteria. In our study, we have used the following
inclusion criteria:
• Paper contains peer-reviewed academic content.
• Paper is written in English.
• Paper is at least six pages in length.
• Paper is evaluating an IDS.
• Paper uses empirically evaluation.
• Paper is indeed using the evaluation metric (specific to each search string) in the evaluation of the IDS.
The primary studies that satisfy the inclusion criteria are considered relevant and will be referred to as
such in the remainder of this paper. For the most part, the inclusion criteria used in our study could not
be automated to filter the primary studies. For instance, the criterion that specifies the number of pages
in primary studies could be automated, albeit, to a limited extent. The limitation is due to the format
of the page number metrics—starting page and ending page—obtained from IEEE Xplore. “V1-470” and
“V1-474”, “5 pp.” and “”, and “I” and “619-22 vol.1” are some of the examples of staring page number
and ending page number, respectively, as returned by IEEE Xplore. The subjectivity of the other criteria
necessitate reading the primary study to determine validity.
The limitations in automating the application of the inclusion criteria warranted the need for a manual
approach. Since the goal is to determine the number of relevant papers, one may have to manually apply
the inclusion criteria to thousands of primary studies. However, reading all the primary studies may have
not been feasible. As a result, we used an approach to estimate the number of relevant papers using a
sample of the primary studies. We used a simple sampling method to1. randomly sample a subset of the
primary studies, 2. determine the proportion of relevant papers in the sample (termed adjustment factor in
our study) by manually applying the inclusion criteria and, 3. estimate the proportion of relevant papers
in the population using the sample proportion. We independently applied the approach to primary studies
associated with each of the evaluation metrics considered in our study.
Our approach to determining the adjustment factor, being manual, is inherently subjective. To control
the bias that may have been induced by the subjectivity, two authors independently applied the inclusion
criteria to the same random sample of primary studies associated with each evaluation metric considered in
our study. The authors’ response to each primary study in the random sample was “include” or “exclude”.
We used an inter-rater reliability measure—Cohen’s κ—to quantify the degree of agreement between the
authors. The strength of agreement between the authors was interpreted from Cohen’s κ values using the
heuristic presented in a work by Landis and Koch [12]. According to the heuristic, the strength of agreement
is (a) almost perfect, if 0.81 < κ < 1.00, (b) substantial, if 0.61 < κ < 0.80, (c) moderate, if 0.41 < κ < 0.60,
(d) fair, if 0.21 < κ < 0.40, (e) slight, if 0.00 < κ < 0.20, and (f) poor, if κ < 0.00 . In cases when the
strength of agreement was less than moderate, we repeated the manual application of the inclusion criteria on
another random sample of the primary studies. There were two such cases—Scalability and Saved Battery—
in our study. Initially, the Cohen’s κ for scalability and saved battery metrics was negative, however, upon
applying the inclusion criteria again we achieved an improvement in Cohen’s κ in both metrics. The next step
toward estimating the adjustment factor was the resolution of disagreements (if any) between the authors
who applied the inclusion criteria. All primary studies that the authors disagreed on were discussed, with
the authors presenting their case for including (or excluding) the primary study. Typically, the discussion
led to one author convincing the other to include (or exclude) a paper. In cases where a discussion failed
to yield consensus among the two authors, a third author resolved the conflict. With the disagreements
resolved, the adjustment factor for each of the evaluation metrics was computed. The final value of Cohen’s
κ and corresponding strength of agreement and the adjustment factor computed for each of the evaluation
metrics are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Agreement between authors when manually applying the inclusion criteria to a random sample of
primary studies and the adjustment factor computed after the resolution of disagreements (if any)
Metric Group Evaluation Metric
Agreement
Adjustment Factor
κ Strength
Effectiveness
Accuracy 0.75 Substantial 0.24
Confusion Matrix 0.90 Almost Perfect 0.38
F-value 0.83 Almost Perfect 0.13
False Negative Rate (FNR) 0.56 Moderate 0.55
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.52 Moderate 0.62
Precision 0.84 Almost Perfect 0.35
Recall 0.88 Almost Perfect 0.33
ROC 1.00 Almost Perfect 0.57
True Negative Rate (TNR) 0.63 Substantial 0.38
Performance
Computational Time 0.51 Moderate 0.25
CPU Usage 0.77 Substantial 0.23
Memory Usage 0.88 Almost Perfect 0.09
Scanning Time 0.59 Moderate 0.35
Slowdown 0.50 Moderate 0.22
Throughput 0.68 Substantial 0.27
Energy Energy Consumption 1.00 Almost Perfect 0.16
DFA
Number of DFA States 0.50 Moderate 0.45
Number of DFA Transitions 0.67 Substantial 0.30
We note that we removed four metrics—scalability, saved battery, expansion factor, and number of
distinct DFA transitions—from our study as the number of relevant papers estimated for these metrics was
negligible.
5 Results
In the subsections that follow, we address each of our research questions using the relevant papers estimated
by using the adjustment factor computed by applying our methodology from Section 4.
RQ0 Usage: What are the commonly used evaluation metrics?
In this research question, we wanted to enumerate the metrics that are commonly used in the evaluation
of IDS. We identified 22 different evaluation metrics, categorized into four metric groups. The definition of
each of the 18 evaluation metrics and their respective metric group, as used in our study, is presented below.
The definition of each of the metrics is either common knowledge or obtained from prior IDS literature.
Nonetheless, each metric definition is complemented with an example of a prior IDS paper that defines
and/or uses the metric.
Effectiveness Metrics
The metrics that belong to this category express the effectiveness of an IDS in labeling an action as an
anomaly, misuse, or intrusion. The metrics in this category are defined in terms of the types of correct or
erroneous classifications that an IDS can make. The outcome from IDS, being a binary classifier, can be one
of (a) true positive (TP), if an intrusive action is classified as such, (b) true negative (TN), if a legitimate
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action is classified as such, (c) false positive (FP), if a legitimate action is classified as intrusive, or (d) false
negative (FN), if an intrusive action is classified as legitimate. We have nine metrics that belong to this
category, they are:
1. Confusion Matrix is a 2×2 matrix that contains the values of TP, TN, FP, and TN. A typical confusion
matrix takes the form show in Table 2. A confusion matrix can also be n×n in dimension in the case of
a multi-class classifier with n different classes. For instance, in applying a multi-class machine learning
model to detecting 20 different classes of malicious web activities, Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [13] have
presented a 20× 20 confusion matrix to assert the effectiveness of the model.
Table 2: Typical confusion matrix
Prediction
Intrusion Legitimate
T
ru
th Intrusion TP FN
Legitimate FP TN
While the confusion matrix in itself is not a metric, it is a container of metrics that may be used to
compute other effectiveness metrics.
2. Accuracy is the proportion of correct classifications (includes both TP and TN). Accuracy may be
computed using (1) with the values of TP, FP, TN, and FN obtained from the confusion matrix.
Accuracy is used as an evaluation metric in a work by Ali and Al-Shaer [14].
accuracy =
(TP + TN)
(TP + FP + TN + FN)
(1)
3. Precision is the proportion of classified actions that are actually intrusive. Precision may be computed
using (2) with the values of TP and FP obtained from the confusion matrix. Precision is used as an
evaluation metric in a work by Tang et al. [15].
precision =
TP
(TP + FP )
(2)
4. Recall is the proportion of intrusive actions that are classified as intrusive. Recall may be computed
using (3) with the values of TP and FN obtained from the confusion matrix. Recall is used as an
evaluation metric in a work by Tang et al. [15].
recall =
TP
(TP + FN)
(3)
5. F-value is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. F-value may be computed using (4) with precision
and recall computed using (2) and (3), respectively. F-value is used as an evaluation metric in a work
by Gupta et al. [16].
f -value = 2 · precision · recall
(precision+ recall)
(4)
6. False Positive Rate (FPR) may be computed using (5) with the values of FN and TP obtained from
the confusion matrix. FPR is used as an evaluation metric in a work by Bartoli et al. [17].
fpr =
FP
(FP + TN)
(5)
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7. False Negative Rate (FNR) may be computed using (6) with the values of FN and TP obtained from
the confusion matrix. FNR is used as an evaluation metric in a work by Bartoli et al. [17].
fnr =
FN
(FN + TP )
(6)
8. True Negative Rate (TNR) may be computed using (7) with the values of TN and FP obtained from
the confusion matrix. TNR is used as an evaluation metric in a work by Sharma et al. [18].
tnr =
TN
(TN + FP )
(7)
9. Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) is a plot of recall as a function of fall-out (i.e. proportion of
legitimate actions classified as such). ROC curve, as the plot is called, is a powerful tool to evaluate
the effectiveness of an IDS while considering the trade-off between recall and fall-out. ROC is used as
an evaluation tool in a work by Salem et al. [19].
Performance Metrics
The metrics that belong to this category express the empirical performance of an IDS in the context of
a testbed. We have seven metrics that belong to this category, they are:
1. Computational time is the time taken to complete an essential task in classifying an action as intru-
sion or legitimate. In evaluating a clustering-based IDS, Owezarski [20] expressed the time taken to
determine clusters as the computational time.
2. CPU usage is the percentage of load on the CPU with the addition of an IDS to the infrastructure.
In evaluating an sensor embedded IDS, Macia´-Pe´rez et al. [21] measured the load on the CPU during
various network bandwidths to assert the performance of their IDS.
3. Memory usage is the amount of memory required by an IDS to perform its classification. In evaluating
an novel approach to string matching in the presence of out-of-sequence pattern matching, Chen et
al. [22] compared the memory usage (in Mega Bytes) of their approach with a state-of-the-art approach.
4. Scanning time is the time spent scanning patterns among pattern rulesets looking for a matching
pattern. In evaluating an approach to high-speed pattern matching in the context of an IDS, Choi and
Seo [23] have used scanning time as a metric.
5. Slowdown is the additional time that a network/host/process takes to complete an operation while
being monitored by an IDS. In evaluating an approach to detecting malicious modifications to operating
system data by kernel rootkits, Hofmann et al. [24] used slowdown as a metric to express the impact
such an approach may have on the operation of the system.
6. Throughput is the amount of data that can be processed by an IDS per second. In evaluating a
memory-efficient pattern matching algorithm, Dharmapurikar and Lockwood [25] used throughput (in
Giga Bits per Second) to assert the performance improvement exhibited by their algorithm.
Energy Metrics
The metrics that belong to this category express the energy consumption of an IDS. The metrics in this
category are typically used in the context of an IDS implementation in Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET),
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), and Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET). We have two metrics that belong
to this category, they are:
1. Energy consumption is the additional energy consumed by a device, typically mobile, with the intro-
duction of an IDS. In evaluating a decentralized IDS in a wireless sensor network, da Silva et al. [26]
measured the increase in energy consumption by a monitor node before and after the activation of an
IDS component.
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Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) Metrics
The metrics that belong to this category express the aspects related to the implementation of an IDS
using Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA). We have four metrics that belong to this category, they are:
1. Number of DFA states is a metric that quantifies the size of a DFA. Number of DFA states is used as
an evaluation metric in a work by Kumar et al. [27].
2. Number of DFA transitions is a metric that quantifies the different paths of transition between states
in a DFA. Number of DFA transitions is used as an evaluation metric in a work by Kumar et al. [27].
RQ1 Comparable: Are empirical studies of intrusion detection systems compa-
rable using consistent evaluation metrics?
In this research question, we wanted to understand the metrics that were most commonly used in the
evaluation of IDSs. We address this question by comparing the number of relevant papers that are associated
with a particular evaluation metric. To estimate the number of relevant papers, we simply multiply the
number of primary studies associated with each evaluation metric and the corresponding adjustment factor
presented in Table 1. The number of primary studies and the number of relevant papers in each of the
18 evaluation metrics is presented in Table 3 in Appendix B. Shown in Figure 1 are all the 18 evaluation
metrics, grouped by metric category, ordered in descending order of the number of relevant papers that use
the metric in the evaluation of an IDS.
Figure 1: Evaluation metrics ordered by the frequency of usage
As seen in the figure, false positive rate and recall effectiveness metrics, slowdown and throughput
performance metrics, energy consumption metric, and number of DFA states DFA metric are the most
commonly used evaluation metrics. The popularity of certain metrics indicate the most common concerns in
evaluating an IDS. For instance, having a low false positive rate is a critical to ensuring that the IDS itself
does not become a source of denial of service to legitimate actions. While few metrics are commonly used,
there still are a high number of other metrics that have been used in considerably large number of relevant
papers. The spectrum of metrics does not facilitate a direct comparison between different relevant papers
preventing an objective evaluation of IDSs for implementation by an organization.
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RQ2 Trade-offs: Do empirical studies of intrusion detection systems consistently
convey trade-offs between evaluation metrics?
In this research question, we wanted to understand the extent to which intrusion detection literature con-
sidered, and reported, trade-offs between evaluation metrics. The trade-off between evaluation metrics is an
important consideration when one is evaluating an IDS. Consider the trade-off between the commonly used
effectiveness metrics: precision and recall. As mentioned earlier, in the context of an IDS, precision is the
proportion of intrusive actions identified that were actually intrusions and recall quantifies the proportion of
all intrusive actions that were identified. An IDS could achieve a precision of 100% if at least one action is
correctly marked as intrusive. Similarly, an IDS could achieve a recall of 100% if all actions are marked as
intrusive. Clearly, an IDS with a precision of 100% or a recall of 100% does not guarantee that all intrusive
actions are marked as such.
We address this research question using venn diagrams to present the number of papers that use two or
more metrics know to trade-off one another. In RQ1, we estimated the number of relevant papers using the
adjustment factor. Here again, we use a similar approach to estimate the number of relevant papers that
use multiple evaluation metrics but with an additional step: the adjustment factors presented in Table 1
were computed for primary studies associated with a single evaluation metric. Since the adjustment factor is
analogous to the probability of finding a relevant paper in a random sample of primary studies, we multiplied
the adjustment factors associated with two or more metrics to compute the adjustment factor that represents
the probability of finding a relevant paper that uses the metrics in question. For instance, the adjustment
factors for precision and recall are 0.35 and 0.33, respectively. The adjustment factor 0.1155 = 0.35 · 0.33
may be used to estimate the number of relevant papers that use both precision and recall.
Figure 2 shows the trade-off between precision and recall. As seen in the figure, a small number of
relevant papers were estimated to be using both precision and recall.
Figure 2: Trade-off between precision and recall
The F-value, being the harmonic mean of precision and recall, may be used to convey the trade-off
between precision and recall. However, presenting all three metrics may enable better interpretation of the
effectiveness of the IDS. From the Figure 3, we see that only a small number of papers that present precision
and recall also present F-value.
In the context of performance, the trade-off between space (memory usage) and time (computational
time) is the one that is most commonly discussed. In evaluating an IDS from a performance perspective,
reporting the improvement in computational time without discussing the potential increase in memory usage
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Figure 3: Trade-off between precision, recall, and F-value
does not enable the objective interpretation of the IDS’ performance. Shown in Figure 4 is the number of
papers that consider this trade-off and report both computational time and memory usage.
The figures reveal that little consideration is given to evaluation metrics that tend to trade-off one another.
As a result, the evaluation may be biased toward a certain aspect.
RQ3 Evolution: Have empirical studies of intrusion detection systems improved
evaluation criteria over time?
In RQ2, we noted the lack of consideration given to trade-off between metrics when evaluation IDSs. In this
research question, we wanted to understand if the evaluation criteria have been improving over the years,
getting better at considering trade-off between metrics. In other words, we wanted to understand if the
number of relevant papers using two or more metrics that tend to trade-off has been increasing over time
relative to the number of relevant papers using the metrics independently.
In the context of this research question, we applied the adjustment factor to the number of primary
studies in each year. The analysis started with the first year in which all metrics considered had at least one
primary study (For example, we had one primary study using recall published in the year 1944, however,
there were no papers that used precision published until the year 1982. Therefore, we used 1982 as the first
year in our analysis).
Shown in Figure 5 is an area plot showing the number of relevant papers that used precision, recall, and
both precision and recall. While the number of relevant papers is low between years 1982 and 1999, all the
papers published in these years used recall as the evaluation metric. We also notice that the number of
relevant papers using both precision and recall is increasing, albeit marginally.
We did perform similar analysis for the performance metrics—computational time and memory usage—
but the number of relevant papers in each year was zero for most years to draw any conclusions.
6 Threats to Validity
In this section, we present some of the threats to validity of our study and the way in which we have mitigated
the threats.
Single Source of Primary Studies
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Figure 4: Trade-off between computational time and memory usage
Although the guidelines [28] recommends the usage of at least two sources (ACM Digital Library and
IEEE Xplore) of academic content, the lack of a convenient way of exporting search results from ACM Digital
Library prevented us from using it as a source of primary studies. An attempt at scraping the search results
of the website led to our IP address being blocked for several days and an email to ACM did not yield a
response.
Subjectivity
Subjectivity is inherent in any manual approach, however, we can control the bias induced by such
inherent subjectivity. We have used inter-rater reliability measure—Cohen’s κ—to quantify, and control, the
bias in scenarios where a manual approach was used.
False Positives in Search Results
A simple full-text search for the phrase “intrusion detection systems” on IEEE Xplore results in more
than 7,000 papers being returned. However, a large proportion of these papers may not be evaluating an IDS
and, therefore, be regarded as false positives in the context of our study. Several papers (For example, the
work by Strunk et al. [29]) merely mention intrusion detection systems in passing or as a possible application
of their algorithm. In our study, we have manually analyzed a random sample of the primary studies returned
by IEEE Xplore to determine a proportion of those that are relevant in the context of IDSs.
Publication Quality
We acknowledge that not every paper published by IEEE are reviewed with the same peer-review stan-
dards. We did not, however, consider the quality of the publications as there are only proxies (such as
number of citations per year and acceptance rate) that have been used to quantify the quality. We have
used a common but crude approach to include papers that contain sufficient detail by removing papers that
have fewer than six pages.
Correctness of Analysis Scripts and Data Aggregation
The search results from IEEE Xplore were exported to CSV files and analyzed using a Python application
(Available as an open-source project at https://github.com/andymeneely/CrossSearchCrawler). We
conducted code reviews throughout the development of the application and also tested the code manually
to ensure correctness.
IEEE Xplore is sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes; including an additional parenthesis could result
in the inclusion or exclusion of hundreds of results. We mitigated this limitation by ensuring that the search
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Figure 5: The evolution of consideration to trade-off between precision and recall
strings adhered to the syntax prescribed by IEEE Xplore.
7 Summary
In this systematic literature review of intrusion detection literature, we aimed to explore the use of metrics in
the evaluation of IDSs, specifically the consistency of metric usage. We manually reviewed a set of 158 papers
and identified 22 metrics that are commonly used in the evaluation of IDSs. We constructed search strings
for each of the 22 metrics and using IEEE Xplore to search for primary studies. We manually reviewed 495
primary studies returned by IEEE Xplore and found 159 of them to be relevant. We used the manual review
to estimate the total number of relevant papers in all primary studies returned by IEEE Xplore. We then
analyzed the number of relevant papers in addressing four research questions.
The results of our review show the inconsistencies that exist in the evaluation of IDS, specifically in the
context of the metrics used. We found that multiple different metrics are used in the evaluation of IDSs
(RQ1) and oftentimes the trade-off between the metrics is not considered (RQ2). A retrospective analysis
of the inconsistencies also revealed that, while the evaluation criteria has been improving over time, the
improvement is marginal at best.
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A Search Strings
Accuracy accuracy AND “intrusion detection system”
Confusion Matrix “confusion matrix” AND “intrusion detection system”
F-value (“f-value” OR “f-measure” OR “f-score” OR “f1” OR “f2” OR “f0.5” OR “detection effectiveness”)
AND “intrusion detection system”
False Negative Rate (FNR) (“false negative rate” OR “type ii error” OR “miss rate”) AND “intrusion
detection system”
False Positive Rate (FPR) (“false positive rate” OR “false positive frequency” OR “false alarm” OR
“type i error” OR “fall-out”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Precision (“precision” OR “positive predictive value”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Recall (“recall” OR “sensitivity” OR “true positive rate” OR “detection rate” OR “hit rate”) AND “in-
trusion detection system”
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) (“roc” OR “receiver operating characteristic” OR “area un-
der curve” OR “area under the curve” OR “area under roc” OR “area under the roc” OR “auc” OR
“auroc”) AND “intrusion detection system”
True Negative Rate (TNR) (“true negative rate” OR “correct rejection” OR “specificity”) AND “in-
trusion detection system”
Computational Time (“computational time” OR “execution time” OR “running time” OR “processing
time”) AND “intrusion detection system”
CPU Usage (“cpu usage” OR “processor usage”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Memory Usage (“memory usage” OR “memory”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Scalability (“number of resources” OR “number of nodes”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Scanning Time (“scanning time” OR “time spent scanning” OR “time spent pattern matching” OR “pat-
tern matching time”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Slowdown (“slowdown” OR “overhead” OR “change in system speed” OR “increase in processing time”)
AND “intrusion detection system”
Throughput (“throughput” OR “processing speed” OR “processing bandwidth” OR “bytes analyzed per
second”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Energy Consumption (“energy consumption” OR “power consumption”) AND “intrusion detection sys-
tem”
Saved Battery (“battery lifetime” OR “battery drain”) AND “intrusion detection system”
Expansion Factor expansion factor AND “dfa” AND “intrusion detection system”
Number of Distinct DFA Transitions (“number of distinct transitions” OR “# of distinct transitions”)
AND “dfa” AND “intrusion detection system”
Number of DFA States (“number of states” OR “num of states”) AND “dfa” AND “intrusion detection
system”
Number of DFA Transitions (“number of transitions” OR “# of transitions”) AND “dfa” AND “intru-
sion detection system”
15
B Number of Primary Studies and Relevant Papers
Table 3: Number of primary studies returned by IEEE Xplore and the number of relevant papers estimated
using the adjustment factor computed from manual review of a random sample of primary studies
Metric Group Evaluation Metric # Primary Studies # Relevant Papers
Effectiveness
Accuracy 2099 512
Confusion Matrix 123 47
F-value 387 48
False Negative Rate (FNR) 258 141
False Positive Rate (FPR) 1440 889
Precision 593 205
Recall 1881 627
ROC 302 171
True Negative Rate (TNR) 111 42
Performance
Computational Time 811 203
CPU Usage 184 42
Memory Usage 2320 216
Scanning Time 20 7
Slowdown 1635 363
Throughput 1015 271
Energy Energy Consumption 564 90
DFA
Number of DFA States 62 28
Number of DFA Transitions 38 11
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